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Abstract
Countries with strong trade linkages have more synchronized business cycles. However, the
standard international business cycle framework cannot replicate this finding, uncovering the
trade-comovement puzzle. Modeling trade using more sophisticated micro-level assumptions
does not help resolve the puzzle. This happens because for a large class of trade models, under
certain macro-level conditions, output comovement is determined by the same factor structure.
We show that in such models comovement can be explained by three factors: (i) the correlation
between each country’s TFP; (ii) the correlation between each country’s share of expenditure on
domestic goods; and (iii) the correlation between each country’s TFP and the partner’s share
of expenditure on domestic goods. An empirical investigation of the link between trade and
each of the three factors shows that the trade-comovement relation is in large part explained by
the second factor while in the theoretical model this factor reacts counterfactually to changes
in trade costs.
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1 Introduction
Substantial empirical evidence suggests that countries or regions with stronger trade linkages have
more correlated business cycles. Frankel and Rose (1998), Clark and van Wincoop (2001), Calderon,
Chong, and Stein (2007), Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004), and Imbs (2004), among others, show that
pairs of countries that trade with each other exhibit a high degree of business cycle comovement.
These findings have been interpreted as evidence that greater trade integration leads to business
cycle synchronization. However, from a theoretical perspective the standard international real
business cycle model (IRBC), based on Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994), has difficulties in
replicating this empirical fact (see Kose and Yi, 2001 and 2006). In the latter paper, the authors’
baseline model explains only one-tenth of the responsiveness of comovement to trade intensity. This
has given rise to the so-called trade-comovement puzzle: standard models are unable to generate
high output correlations arising from high bilateral trade intensity.
In the conventional IRBC framework, trade is modeled using the Armington specification, which
imposes an exogenous trade specialization pattern. In the Armington framework trade adjustments
are only at the intensive margin. By contrast, in the new trade theory, trade shares also adjust
at the extensive margin: when a country’s relative efficiency declines it exports a narrower range
of goods. We show that modeling trade linkages using more sophisticated micro-level assumptions
does not help resolve the trade-comovement puzzle. This happens because output comovement in
an important class of trade models is determined by the same factor structure.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that under certain macro-level assumptions, in a large
class of trade models, output correlation between country i and country j, denoted cor
(
Y˜i, Y˜j
)
,
is explained by three factors: (i) the correlation between each country’s total factor productivity
(TFP), denoted cor
(
A˜i, A˜j
)
; (ii) the correlation between each country’s share of expenditure on
domestic goods, cor
(
λ˜ii, λ˜jj
)
; and (iii) the correlation between a country’s share of expenditure on
domestic goods and the partner’s TFP, cor
(
λ˜ii, A˜j
)
. This relation is summarized by the following
equation:
cor
(
Y˜i, Y˜j
)
= β1 cor
(
A˜i, A˜j
)
+ β2 cor
(
λ˜ii, λ˜jj
)
+ β3 cor
(
λ˜ii, A˜j
)
. (1)
Therefore, the ability of a model to generate higher output synchronization arising from increased
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bilateral trade depends on the extent to which trade integration affects each of these three factors.
This result relates to recent work by Arkolakis, Demidova, Klenow, and Rodriguez-Clare (2008) and
Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2012) concerning the welfare gains from trade. These
authors show that the real wage (which determines the welfare gains from trade) can be computed
as a function of the import penetration ratio and an elasticity parameter that, depending on
the particular micro-level assumptions, relates either to preferences or technology. In particular,
Arkolakis et al. (2012) show that the gains from trade have the same form in a large class of trade
models including the Armington model, Eaton and Kortum (2002), Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and
Kortum (2003), Krugman (1980), and multiple versions of Melitz (2003).
In the context of the IRBC model that concerns us, the labor supply responds to changes in the real
wage (which is a function of the share of expenditure on domestic goods). It follows that, in the
absence of short-run wealth effects on the labor supply, the share of expenditure on domestic goods,
a parameter related to the labor supply elasticity and the trade elasticity are the only determinants
of employment and output fluctuations in response to foreign shocks.
Using data on bilateral trade in manufacturing, TFP and output correlations for a panel of 21 OECD
countries, we show that the two factors that explain the trade-comovement relation empirically are
the correlation between each country-pair’s TFP and the correlation between each country-pair’s
share of expenditure on domestic goods. To investigate the quantitative implications of this result,
our starting point is a multi-country model of international trade with endogenous specialization
inspired by Eaton and Kortum (2002). We embed it into an IRBC framework by including country
specific fluctuations in TFP, allowing for endogenous labor supply, intertemporal substitution in
consumption and complete financial markets. We show that the trade-comovement puzzle arises
because higher trade integration counterfactually lowers the correlation between each country’s
share of expenditure on domestic goods.
When we allow for the correlation of TFP shocks to increase with trade, as observed in the data,
the model is more successful in replicating the link between trade and comovement. However, we
show that even in the presence of correlated shocks, the model still implies a counterfactual relation
between bilateral trade and each country pair’s correlation of the share of expenditure on domestic
goods. The reason for this result is twofold. First, a TFP shock implies a deterioration in the
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terms-of-trade. Second, the elasticity of the share of expenditure on domestic goods to changes in
the terms-of-trade is increasing in the level of bilateral trade. Therefore, following a TFP shock at
Home, the Foreign share of expenditure on domestic goods will fall by more, the higher the level
of trade integration between Home and Foreign.
In our model, Home TFP improvements are transmitted positively to the trade-partners through a
deterioration of Home’s terms-of-trade. This is a common feature in most IRBC models. However,
this feature is shown to be counterfactual for many countries. For example, Corsetti, Dedola and
Leduc (2008 and 2014) show that the terms-of-trade improve conditional on positive TFP shocks,
in particular in large countries and relatively less open economies. Raffo (2008) finds that, contrary
to what is implied by the standard IRBC model, the terms-of-trade do not have a strong cyclical
pattern. We show that with countercyclical terms-of-trade it is not possible for trade integration
to raise the correlations of the share of expenditure on domestic goods. Therefore, this provides
more evidence in favor of models with acyclical or procyclical terms-of-trade. Ghironi and Melitz
(2005) and also Corsetti et al. (2008) develop models that imply procyclical terms-of-trade.
Our work is related to a strand of the literature that extends the IRBC model by changing the micro-
level assumptions about trade to improve the model’s ability to explain the empirical association
between trade and business cycle synchronization. Most closely related to our work is Arkolakis
and Ramanarayanan (2009), who develop a two-country IRBC model based on the Eaton and
Kortum (2002) framework. Unlike what we do in this paper, they augment their model with
vertical specialization and conclude that vertical specialization alone is insufficient to solve the
trade-comovement puzzle. They suggest that allowing for variable markups combined with vertical
specialization may be helpful to resolve the trade-comovement puzzle. While also focusing on the
link between trade and comovement, we differ from their paper in purpose and scope. Our aim is to
derive a general framework to understand why standard models fail to account for the link between
trade and business cycle synchronization and to identify the sources of the trade-comovement puzzle.
Our paper also contributes to the growing literature on the trade-comovement puzzle. Burstein,
Kurz, and Tesar (2008) and di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010) emphasize the relevance of vertical
linkages in production to explain the effects of bilateral trade on business cycle synchronization.
However, Johnson (2014) finds evidence against the idea that input trade is the missing link to
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understand the trade-comovement relation, as comovement in value added is not greatly increased
with trade integration. In a related study, Liao and Santacreu (2015) build a model based on
Ghironi and Melitz (2005), where the dynamics of TFP are driven by extensive margin changes in
the number and average productivity of domestic and foreign intermediate producers. Their model
is able to produce endogenous TFP correlations consistent with the data. Finally, Drozd, Kolbin,
and Nosal (2014) show that the ability of the business cycle model to account for the link between
trade and comovement crucially depends on the dynamic properties of the trade elasticity. This
happens because the trade elasticity plays a major role in determining how business cycle shocks
spill over across borders. In particular, they show that short-run frictions generate a low short-run
elasticity and a high long-run elasticity which allows for theory to be closer to the data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our equilibrium model of trade
and the business cycle used to analyze the relation between trade integration and business cycle
synchronization. In Section 3 we study in depth the channels through which trade affects business
cycle synchronization and, in particular, derive equation (1) that represents the factor structure of
GDP comovement. Section 4 presents the main empirical and quantitative findings of the paper.
In Section 5 we investigate the robustness of our results to changes in the assumptions about the
financial market structure, preferences and production. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The Theoretical Economy
In this Section, we develop a simple model of the world economy to study the link between trade
integration and business cycle synchronization. The setup of the model builds on Eaton and
Kortum (EK, 2002) and Alvarez and Lucas (2007), but it incorporates intertemporal substitution
in consumption and endogenous labor supply. The world economy consists of n countries. Each
country is populated with a continuum (unit measure) of identical households. At each date t, the
world economy experiences one of finitely many states, or events, st ∈ S ≡ [s (1) , . . . , s (k)]. We
denote by st = (s0, . . . , st) the history of events through period t. The probability of any particular
event st+1 conditional on history s
t is pi(st+1|s
t). The initial realization s0 is given.
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2.1 Technology and Market Structure
Each country has two sectors: a traded intermediate good sector and a non-traded final good
sector. The intermediate good sector produces a continuum of traded differentiated inputs using
labor. The final good sector is represented by a stand-in firm that produces a non-traded good
that is a composite of the intermediate varieties. All markets are perfectly competitive. In what
follows we describe each sector in greater detail.
Final Good Sector
The stand-in final good firm in country i makes use of a continuum of differentiated manufactured
intermediate commodities indexed by v ∈ [0, 1] that are combined as follows:
Yi
(
st
)
=
[∫ 1
0
mi
(
v, st
)φ
dv
]1/φ
, (2)
where mi
(
v, st
)
is the input of the differentiated intermediate commodity of type v. The parameter
φ ∈ (0, 1) relates to the elasticity of substitution across differentiated intermediate commodities,
given by σ = 1/ (1− φ). From (2), it follows that the demand in country i for intermediate variety
v satisfies the relation
mi
(
ν, st
)
=
[
pi
(
v, st
)
Pi (st)
]−σ
Yi
(
st
)
, (3)
where Pi
(
st
)
=
[∫ 1
0 pi
(
v, st
)1−σ
dv
]1/(1−σ)
is the ideal price index in country i of the composite
of intermediate commodities, with pi
(
v, st
)
the price of intermediate variety v in country i. The
stand-in final good firm is perfectly competitive and, hence, the final good’s price is also Pi
(
st
)
.
Intermediate Good Sector
The structure of the intermediate-good sector is as in EK where technology differences are modeled
using a probabilistic approach. Countries have differential access to technology, so efficiency varies
across commodities and countries. The intermediate commodities are subject to trade barriers that
take the form of an iceberg cost : to successfully deliver in country j one unit of any differentiated
intermediate commodity produced in country i, τji ≥ 1 units need to be shipped, with τii = 1.
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Producing one unit of the intermediate commodity v in country i requires
[
Ai
(
st
)
ϕi,v
]−1
units
of labor, where Ai
(
st
)
follows a mean one, serially correlated discrete Markov process and is
independent across countries. Therefore, the cost for intermediate firms in country i to deliver one
unit of intermediate commodity v to country j is
pji
(
v, st
)
=
[
Wi
(
st
)
Ai (st)ϕi,v
]
τji, (4)
where Wi
(
st
)
is the wage rate in country i. There is perfect competition, so country i firms
potentially sell the commodity v to country j at price pji
(
v, st
)
. The commodity is purchased from
the lowest-cost supplier; hence, the price of commodity v in country j is given by
pj
(
v, st
)
= min
i=1,...,n
[
pji
(
v, st
)]
. (5)
The variable ϕi,v determines the efficiency of country i to produce input v. We follow EK and
model firms’ efficiency using a probabilistic approach: it is assumed that country i’s efficiency in
producing commodity v is the realization of a random variable ϕ, which is drawn independently
for each v. Country i’s efficiency follows a Fre´chet distribution:
Fi (ϕ) = exp
(
−Tiϕ
−θ
)
, (6)
where θ > 1 and Ti > 0. The parameter θ controls the degree of heterogeneity across firms, with
higher θ implying less heterogeneity, and Ti controls the country’s overall efficiency. We consider a
symmetric world economy and, henceforth, assume that Ti is the same across countries, normalized
to unity. The upshot is that in equilibrium the ideal price index in country j is
Pj
(
st
)
= κΦj
(
st
)−1/θ
, (7)
where κ > 0 is a constant and the random variable
Φj
(
st
)
=
n∑
i=1
[
Wi
(
st
)
τji
Ai (st)
]−θ
, (8)
determines the distribution of prices.1
1κ =
[
Γ
(
1−σ+θ
θ
)]1/(1−σ)
, where Γ(.) is the Gamma function.
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Bilateral Trade Flows
The probability λji that country i is the lowest-cost supplier to j for any particular intermediate
commodity is given by2
λji
(
st
)
=
[
κWi
(
st
)
τji
Ai (st)Pi (st)
]−θ
. (9)
Since there are a continuum of intermediate goods, the probability λji also corresponds to country
j’s expenditure on country i’s differentiated intermediate goods as a fraction of country j’s total
expenditure on differentiated intermediate goods. This measure of bilateral trade intensity is closely
linked to one of the measures proposed by Frankel and Rose (FR, 1998), which is the sum of a
country’s bilateral exports divided by the sum of each country’s aggregate net income.
2.2 Preferences and Financial Markets
The stand-in household in country i has preferences represented by a utility function of the form
introduced by Greenwood et al. (1988), given by
u
(
Ci, Li; s
t
)
= ln
[
Ci
(
st
)
−
Li
(
st
)1+1/σn
1 + 1/σn
]
, (10)
where Ci
(
st
)
and Li
(
st
)
are, respectively, consumption and time spent working by the stand-in
household. The parameter σn corresponds to the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The choice of
preferences does not have wealth effects and therefore excludes intertemporal substitution in the
labor choice.3
There are complete financial markets. In particular, we assume the existence of a complete set
of Arrow securities denominated in units of the nume´raire. Thus, the budget constraint of the
stand-in agent in country i is
Pi
(
st
)
Ci
(
st
)
+
∑
s∈S
Q
(
st, s
)
Bi
(
st, s
)
=Wi
(
st
)
Li
(
st
)
+Bi
(
st−1, st
)
, (11)
2This probability is obtained by calculating λji
(
st
)
= Prob
(
pji
(
v, st
)
≤ min
[
pjl
(
v, st
)
; l 6= i
])
.
3Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) find evidence of a weak wealth effect in labor supply choices. Raffo (2008) shows
that this choice of preferences in IRBC models helps reproducing the cyclical properties of quantities, including the
correlation and volatility of trade variables with respect to output.
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where Bi
(
st, s
)
denotes the quantity of bonds purchased by the stand-in household in country i
following history st, that entitles the holder to receive a payment worth one unit of the nume´raire
in period t + 1 if the state of the economy at that date turns out to be s ∈ S. The price of this
state contingent security in units of the nume´raire is denoted by Q
(
st, s
)
. The Bellman equation
characterizing the stand-in household optimal behavior is
Vi
(
st
)
= max
Ci,Li
u (Ci, Li; st)+ β ∑
st+1∈S
pi
(
st+1|s
t
)
Vi
(
st+1
) , (12)
with β ∈ (0, 1) and subject to the budget constraint (11).
2.3 Equilibrium Conditions
The first-order conditions that characterize the solution to the problem of the stand-in household
in country i are given by
Q
(
st, st+1
)
µi
(
st
)
= βpi
(
st+1|s
t
)
µi
(
st+1
)
∀ st+1 ∈ S, (13)
µi
(
st
)
= βRt
∑
st+1∈S
pi
(
st+1|s
t
)
µi
(
st+1
)
, (14)
Li
(
st
)
=
[
Wi
(
st
)
Pi (st)
]σn
, (15)
with Rt =
[∑
s∈S
Q
(
st, s
)]−1
and where
µi
(
st
)
=
1
Pi (st)
[
Ci
(
st
)
−
Li
(
st
)1+1/σn
1 + 1/σn
]−1
, (16)
represents the marginal utility of current per capita wealth in units of the nume´raire for the stand-in
household in country i following history st. From equation (9), the real wage in country i can be
expressed in terms of the technology shock Ai and the share of expenditure on domestic goods λii,
as follows
Wi
(
st
)
Pi (st)
=
Ai
(
st
)
κ
[
1
λii (st)
]1/θ
. (17)
9
Substituting for the real wage in (15) using (17), it follows that equilibrium hours worked can be
expressed as
Li
(
st
)
=
[
Ai
(
st
)
κ
]σn [
1
λii (st)
]σn/θ
. (18)
The market clearing condition in financial markets requires
n∑
i=1
Bi
(
st, s
)
= 0, ∀ s ∈ S. (19)
Equilibrium in the market for produced goods in each country i requires total domestic labor income
Wi
(
st
)
Li
(
st
)
to equal world spending on domestically produced goods, so that
Wi
(
st
)
Li
(
st
)
=
n∑
j=1
λji
(
st
) [
Wj
(
st
)
Lj
(
st
)
+Dj
(
st
)]
, (20)
where
Dj
(
st
)
= Bj
(
st−1, st
)
−
∑
s∈S
Q
(
st, s
)
Bj
(
st, s
)
, (21)
is country j’s trade deficit. Of course, the market clearing condition (19) implies that
n∑
i=0
Di
(
st
)
=
0.
Finally, using (21) to substitute in (11) we have
Pi
(
st
)
Ci
(
st
)
=Wi
(
st
)
Li
(
st
)
+Di
(
st
)
. (22)
Sequential Competitive Equilibrium
Define the n × 1 wage vector Wt =
[
W1
(
st
)
, . . . ,Wn
(
st
)]′
, the k × 1 security price vector Qt =[
Q1
(
st, s (1)
)
, . . . ,Qk
(
st, s (k)
)]′
, the n × 1 consumption vector Ct =
[
C1
(
st
)
, . . . , Cn
(
st
)]′
, the
n × 1 employment vector Lt =
[
L1
(
st
)
, . . . , Ln
(
st
)]′
, and the n × k matrix that describes the
security holdings Bt =
[
B1
(
st
)
, . . . ,Bn
(
st
)]′
, where Bi
(
st
)
≡
[
Bi
(
st, s (1)
)
, . . . , Bi
(
st, s (k)
)]
.
A sequential competitive equilibrium in the world economy is an allocation {[Ct,Lt,Bt]}
∞
t=0, a wage
sequence {Wt}
∞
t=0 and a price sequence for the Arrow securities {Qt}
∞
t=0 such that at every date t:
the stand-in household in each country behaves optimally given wages and prices; condition (19) is
satisfied, so that financial markets clear; condition (20) is satisfied, so that product markets clear.
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In the sequel, we consider a symmetric world economy with ex-ante identical countries, so that we
have µi
(
s0
)
= µ¯ for all i = 1, . . . , n. The upshot is that, with complete markets, equation (13)
implies that, for each history st, µi
(
st
)
= µt for all i, . . . , n. This corresponds to the familiar risk-
sharing condition conditional on trade costs: the relative marginal utility of consumption between
country i and country j is equal to their consumption based real exchange rate, as follows4
u′c
(
Ci, Li; s
t
)
u′c (Cj , Lj ; s
t)
=
Pi
(
st
)
Pj (st)
. (23)
Finally, from (14), µt must satisfy the familiar Euler equation
µt = βRtEt (µt+1) , (24)
with Et (µt+1) =
∑
st+1∈S
pi
(
st+1|s
t
)
µt+1, the conditional expectation of µt+1 at date t.
Following standard steps, the individual optimality conditions and the market clearing conditions
are log-linearized around the symmetric deterministic steady state equilibrium and combined so as
to characterize the equilibrium dynamics.5
3 Trade and the Channels of Synchronization
In this Section we use the equilibrium conditions obtained in Section 2 to better understand the
nature of the trade-comovement puzzle. We begin by constructing a measure of real GDP that is
consistent with the methodology used by the National Accounts. Then, we show that comovement
in real GDP can be explained by three factors: the correlation between each country’s TFP; the
correlation between each country’s share of expenditure on domestic goods; and the correlation
between each country’s TFP and the partner’s share of expenditure on domestic goods.
4Fitzgerald (2012) tests and fails to reject the hypothesis of optimal consumption risk-sharing conditional on
trade costs among developed countries in the context of a gravity model with intertemporal trade, similar to the one
developed here.
5Alvarez and Lucas (2007) establish a very generic result for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium with balanced
trade in a model with the EK structure. They also develop a tatoˆnement algorithm to numerically solve for the
equilibrium. In our framework, thanks to the symmetry assumption, it is possible to solve analytically for the steady
state equilibrium. See Appendix A for details. The log-linear model is described in Appendix B.
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3.1 GDP at Constant Prices
The construction of a measure of real GDP consistent with the National Accounts requires the
computation of value added at constant prices. Arkolakis and Ramanarayanan (2009) show that
measuring real GDP correctly implies that comovement in total factor productivity (TFP) across
countries is unrelated to the degree of trade integration.6 Their result has important implications
for our analysis as we show below.
Using the fact that the value added by each intermediate good firm evaluated at current prices is
equal to that firm’s wage bill, so that pi
(
v, st
)
yi
(
v, st
)
=Wi
(
st
)
Li
(
v, st
)
, GDP at constant prices
in country i is given by
Yi
(
st
)
≡
∫
Ωi(st)
pi
(
v, s0
)
yi
(
v, st
)
dv =
∫
Ωi(st)
[
pi
(
v, s0
)
pi (v, st)
]
Wi
(
st
)
Li
(
v, st
)
dv, (25)
where Ωi
(
st
)
is the set of differentiated intermediate goods produced in country i in period t,
yi
(
v, st
)
is the output of intermediate good v produced by country i, Li
(
v, st
)
is employment in
industry v and pi
(
v, s0
)
is the price of the intermediate variety v in period 0, which is chosen as
the base year to compute GDP at constant prices.
Of course, some goods produced by country i in period t may not have been produced in period
0 and therefore Ωi
(
st
)
6= Ωi
(
s0
)
. For such goods, pi
(
v, s0
)
is undefined. One way to resolve this
problem is to use the price at which country i would have been able to sell the good to itself, had it
not imported it, pii
(
v, s0
)
. This interpretation seems the most consistent with the recommendation
by the UN System of National Accounts 1993 (SNA 93), which suggests to use the average price
changes of similar products as a proxy for the change in price of the new good.7 Following this
convention and making use of (4), equation (25) can be written as follows
Yi
(
st
)
=
∫
Ωi(st)
[
Ai
(
st
)
Ai (s0)
Wi
(
s0
)
/ϕi,n
Wi (st) /ϕi,n
]
Wi
(
st
)
Li
(
v, st
)
dv,
= Ai
(
st
) ∫
Ωi(st)
Li
(
v, st
)
dv = Ai
(
st
)
Li
(
st
)
,
(26)
6Kehoe and Ruhl (2008) demonstrate a similar result.
7Following Arkolakis and Ramanarayanan (2009), an alternative would be to use the price at which the good was
imported at date 0. The two approaches yield the same conclusion about the muted role of trade in measured TFP.
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where we use the labor market clearing condition and set Wi
(
s0
)
/Ai
(
s0
)
= 1, without loss of
generality. The upshot is that measured total factor productivity is given by
TFPi,t =
Yi
(
st
)
Li (st)
= Ai
(
st
)
, (27)
and, hence, it is independent from changes in the terms-of-trade or the level of trade integration.
Finally, combining (26) with (18) we obtain
Yi
(
st
)
= κ−σnAi
(
st
)1+σn [ 1
λii (st)
]σn/θ
. (28)
3.2 Factor Structure of GDP Comovement
From equation (28) it follows that real GDP fluctuations in country i (in log deviations from steady
state) are given by
Y˜i,t = (1 + σn) A˜i,t −
(σn
θ
)
λ˜ii,t. (29)
Expression (29) implies that the degree of comovement between any country-pair depends on the
correlation between each country’s productivity levels A˜i,t and on the correlation between each
country’s share of expenditures on domestic goods λ˜ii,t (which, in log-deviation from steady state,
is equal to the negative of the import penetration ratio). It turns out that expression (29) holds
for a large class of trade models, as we establish in Result 1:
Result 1 Suppose the following macro-level assumptions are satisfied:
A1. Profits are a constant share of revenue;
A2. The import demand system exhibits constant elasticity of substitution (CES);
A3. Labor supply choices are independent of wealth.
It follows that, irrespective of the micro-level assumptions about trade, output fluctuations are given
by equation (29).
See appendix C for proof.
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This result builds on the work of Arkolakis et al. (2012), who show that the predictions of a large
class of trade models concerning the change in real income associated with any foreign shock only
depend on the import penetration ratio and the trade elasticity. The relevant class of models
is large and includes many well-known trade models such as the Armington model, Eaton and
Kortum (2002), Bernard et al. (2003) extension of EK to imperfect competition, Krugman (1980),
and multiple versions of Melitz (2003).
From equation (29), we obtain the following three-factor model for the output correlation between
countries i and j
cor
(
Y˜i, Y˜j
)
= β1 cor
(
A˜i, A˜j
)
+ β2 cor
(
λ˜ii, λ˜jj
)
+ β3cor
(
λ˜ii, A˜j
)
, (30)
where cor (x, z) denotes the correlation between two variables x and z. The coefficients β1 and β2
are positive while β3 is negative.
8 The equation implies three channels through which trade can
increase business cycle synchronization, summarized in the following result:
Result 2 The output correlation for each country-pair may be expressed as the sum of three factors,
as in equation (30). It follows that there are three channels through which an increase in bilateral
trade may increase business cycle synchronization: (i) increased bilateral trade resulting in a higher
correlation between each country’s technology shocks; (ii) increased bilateral trade resulting in a
8The factor loadings are given by
β1 ≡ (1 + σn)
2

var
(
A˜i
)
var
(
Y˜i
)

 , β2 ≡ (σn
θ
)2 var
(
λ˜ii
)
var
(
Y˜i
)

 and
β3 ≡ −2 (1 + σn) (σn/θ)

 std
(
A˜i
)
std
(
λ˜ii
)
var
(
Y˜i
)

 .
where var and std denote, respectively, the variance and standard deviation of a variable x. See Appendix D for
detailed derivations. The intuition for the sign of the coefficients is as follows. (i) If two countries have more
correlated TFPs, their GDPs will also be more correlated, and this effect is stronger when the relative volatility of
TFP, var
(
A˜i
)
/var
(
Y˜i
)
, is high. (ii) The correlation of the share of expenditure on domestic goods is positively
related to GDP correlations because an increase in the domestic expenditure on domestic goods is associated with a
lower real wage and a lower real GDP; hence, if the domestic expenditure shares are positively correlated, then, all
else equal, GDPs will be positively correlated, and this effect is stronger when the relative volatility of the expenditure
share, var
(
λ˜ii
)
/var
(
Y˜i
)
, is high. (iii) Finally, the correlation of the share of expenditure on domestic goods with
foreign TFP is negatively related to the GDP correlation because, if the Home expenditure on domestic goods rises
when foreign TFP rises, home GDP is lower while foreign GDP is higher, all else equal.
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higher correlation between each country’s share of expenditure on domestic goods; and (iii) increased
bilateral trade reducing the correlation between the share of expenditure on domestic goods and
foreign technology shocks.
See appendix D for proof.
Equation (30) and Result 2 provide the basis for the empirical analysis that follows. We use
bilateral trade data on manufactures, manufacturing output and employment for a panel of 21
OECD countries over the period 1988 – 2007. The share of expenditure on domestic goods λii
(equivalently, one minus the import penetration ratio) can be calculated from bilateral trade data.
We compute TFP for each country as the ratio between real manufacturing GDP and employment
in manufacturing, calculate the correlations for each term of equation (30) and estimate the three-
factor structure. We evaluate our model by testing if the estimated factor loadings have the expected
signs and are statistically significant, and by judging the model’s goodness of fit.
If the fit of the empirical model is judged to be good, we can dissect the trade-comovement puzzle
by examining the channels through which trade leads to business cycle synchronization in the
theoretical model and contrast it with the empirical results. By inspecting how bilateral trade
intensity affects each of the three factors we are able to identify if country-pairs that trade more
experience stronger output comovement because of: (i) higher correlation between each country’s
TFP; (ii) higher correlation between each country’s share of expenditure on domestic goods; or (iii)
lower correlation between the share of expenditure on domestic goods and foreign TFP.
Finally, notice that the three factors are not independent. In particular, an increased correlation
between each country’s TFP may imply an increased correlation between each country’s share of
expenditure on domestic goods. We investigate this possibility using the theoretical model and
allowing for TFP correlation to vary with the level of trade integration in a way that is consistent
with the data. The next Section describes the quantitative results.
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4 Quantitative Results
This Section examines the ability of our model to replicate the trade-comovement relation by
confronting the model with the data. We first estimate a regression in the spirit of FR using both
empirical data and simulated data from the theoretical model. To this aim, we solve the model
for a world economy where the number of countries n is set equal to four, implying six distinct
country-pairs. This allows us to construct a symmetric world economy matching the minimum,
maximum and median bilateral trade flows observed in the data and reported in Table 1. In the
baseline model, the correlation of the TFP shocks is fixed for all country pairs at a level that
matches the median correlation observed in the empirical data (the details about the calibration
are explained in Appendix F).
After establishing that our model with uncorrelated technology shocks is unable to replicate the
link between trade and comovement observed in the data we proceed in two steps. First, we dissect
the relation between trade and business cycle synchronization by analyzing the three-factor model
of equation (30) and assessing how trade affects each factor. Second, we allow for the presence of
endogenous TFP correlations and show that although the model is now more successful to explain
the trade-comovement relation, it still implies a counterfactual relation between trade integration
and cor
(
λ˜ii, λ˜jj
)
.
4.1 The FR Regression
As a starting point we estimate by ordinary least squares (OLS) the following regression in the
spirit of FR using both empirical and simulated data:
cor
(
Y˜i, Y˜j
)
= b0 + b1 log
(
Bilateral Trade
)
ij
+ εij , (31)
where cor
(
Y˜i, Y˜j
)
is the correlation between detrended log GDP in country i and country j, and
log
(
Bilateral Trade
)
ij
is log of the country-pair’s bilateral trade intensity, defined as the sum of
bilateral manufacturing imports from country i to country j and from country j to country i, as
a fraction of the two countries’ total manufacturing output averaged over the entire period. We
estimate equation (31) using manufacturing data, obtained from the OECD STAN database over
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (empirical data)
Bilateral trade
Detrended GDP Detrended TFP
correlation correlation
Minimum 0.001 −0.557 −0.636
Maximum 0.388 0.991 0.900
Median 0.015 0.645 0.350
Std. deviation 0.042 0.390 0.377
The number of observations is 210 country-pairs. See Appendix E for details.
GDP and TFP are linearly detrended.
the 1988 – 2007 period. We focus on manufacturing data because our empirical work requires panel
data on bilateral trade flows and the manufacturing data allows us to extend the time-series length
of the panel substantially. However, the FR result about trade and comovement is robust across
alternative measures of output and trade. Details about the data are included in Appendix E.
The first two columns of Table 2 show the OLS estimates of the FR regression. The first column
only includes the bilateral trade covariate and shows that an increase in trade intensity leads to
higher business cycle synchronization. The estimated b1 coefficient is statistically significant and
equal to 0.103. In terms of magnitude, the slope coefficient estimate implies that a country pair
with twice the trade intensity of another country pair will have a 0.071 higher GDP correlation.
However, in this regression the R2 is small, indicating that bilateral trade only explains 10% of
the cross-section variation in business cycle comovement. Therefore, in the second column we
also include fixed effects for each individual country.9 The estimated b1 coefficient in the second
regression remains positive and significant with a value of 0.074, indicating that there are no severe
problems with omitted variable bias. Reassuringly, the adjusted R2 is greatly increased at 73%,
suggesting that the fixed effects capture most of the variation due to unobserved covariates.
The third column in Table 2 reports the slope coefficient implied by the baseline model. In this
9As the unit of observation is the country-pair, we identify a fixed effect for each individual country. In particular,
fixed effects regression that we estimate is
cor
(
Y˜i, Y˜j
)
= b0 + b1 log
(
Bilateral Trade
)
ij
+ fi + fj + εij ,
with fi and fj the country fixed effects.
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Table 2: Frankel and Rose regressions (data and model)
dependent variable: cor
(
Y˜i, Y˜j
) empirical data model
1. 2. 3.
log
(
Bilateral Trade
)
0.103*** 0.074*** 0.007
(4.87) (3.79)
constant 0.963*** 1.391*** 0.412
(10.36) (4.64)
country dummies no yes —
Adj. R2 0.10 0.72 —
observations 210 210 —
Wald test:
b1,data = b1,baseline model 20.60 (0.00) 11.80 (0.00) —
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Coefficient estimates reported with t−stat in parentheses.
Wald test reported with p−value in parentheses.
case b1 is equal to 0.007, which is at least an order of magnitude smaller than the slope coefficient
from the data. The Wald test is performed to test if the coefficient estimated using empirical data
is the same as the implied coefficient obtained from the model. The null hypothesis is, of course,
overwhelmingly rejected. This constitutes the trade-comovement puzzle documented in Kose and
Yi (2006): the theoretical model is not able to replicate the empirical relation between trade and
business cycle synchronization. Thus, our first finding is that a model that represents trade using
the more sophisticated EK structure is not more successful at explaining the relationship between
trade and business cycle comovement than the standard IRBC model.
4.2 Dissecting the Trade-comovement Puzzle
We use the factor structure of GDP comovement obtained in equation (30) to dissect the sources
of the trade-comovement puzzle. We begin by examining if the factor structure derived for the
theoretical economy holds empirically. The results in the first column of Table 3 are encouraging.
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Table 3: The factor structure of GDP comovement (empirical data)
dependent variable
cor
(
Y˜i, Y˜j
)
cor
(
A˜i, A˜j
)
cor
(
λ˜ii, λ˜jj
)
cor
(
λ˜ii, A˜j
)
1. 2. 3. 4.
cor
(
A˜i, A˜j
)
0.135*
(1.96)
cor
(
λ˜ii, λ˜jj
)
0.320***
(5.15)
cor
(
λ˜ii, A˜j
)
−0.282*
(−1.84)
log
(
Bilateral Trade
)
0.061*** 0.074*** −0.014
(2.87) (3.25) (−1.41)
constant 0.266*** 0.560*** 0.937*** −0.130***
(5.61) (5.61) (9.42) (−3.04)
Adj. R2 0.17 0.03 0.04 0.00
observations 210 210 210 210
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Coefficient estimates reported with t−stat in parentheses.
Each factor loading has the expected sign and the three factors explain 17% of the variation in
comovement observed in the data. Thus, the factor structure implied by equation (30) provides a
satisfactory empirical model of GDP comovement and, hence, we can use it to inspect the sources
of the trade comovement puzzle.
Having established that the fit of the three-factor model is good and consistent with theory, the next
step is to study how each factor responds to changes in bilateral trade intensity. This allows us to
study empirically the channels through which trade leads to higher business cycle synchronization,
and contrast these results with the theoretical predictions (within the framework of Result 2). To
19
-8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
log(trade)
co
rr
e
la
tio
n
trade and cor(Yi,Yj)
data
model
-8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
log(trade)
co
rr
e
la
tio
n
trade and cor(Ai,Aj)
data
model
-8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
log(trade)
co
rr
e
la
tio
n
trade and cor(Oii,Ojj)
data
model
-8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
log(trade)
co
rr
e
la
tio
n
trade and cor(Oii,Aj)
data
model
Figure 1: trade and comovement (baseline model)
do this, we estimate by OLS the following three equations:
cor
(
A˜i, A˜j
)
= b0 + b1 log
(
Bilateral Trade
)
ij
+ εij , (32)
cor
(
λ˜ii, λ˜jj
)
= b0 + b1 log
(
Bilateral Trade
)
ij
+ εij , (33)
cor
(
λ˜ii, A˜j
)
= b0 + b1 log
(
Bilateral Trade
)
ij
+ εij . (34)
The last three columns of Table 3 report the estimation results. The results suggest that higher
bilateral trade intensity is associated with (i) a higher correlation between each country’s technology
shocks, and (ii) a higher correlation between each country’s share of expenditure on domestic goods.
By contrast, there is no significant relation between trade and the correlation between the share of
expenditure on domestic goods and foreign TFP. Therefore, we conclude that empirically the first
and second factors are responsible for the positive association between trade and business cycle
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Table 4: Trade and business cycle synchronization
dependent variable
cor
(
Y˜i, Y˜j
)
cor
(
A˜i, A˜j
)
cor
(
λ˜ii, λ˜jj
)
cor
(
λ˜ii, A˜j
)
1. 2. 3. 4.
Panel A – empirical data
log
(
Bilateral Trade
)
0.103*** 0.061*** 0.074*** −0.014
(4.87) (2.87) (3.25) (−1.41)
constant 0.963*** 0.560*** 0.937*** −0.130***
(10.36) (5.61) (9.42) (−3.04)
Panel B – model: baseline
log
(
Bilateral Trade
)
0.007 0.000 −0.171 −0.088
constant 0.412 0.350 −1.022 −0.570
Panel C – model: endogenous TFP correlations
log
(
Bilateral Trade
)
0.065 0.061 −0.115 −0.035
constant 0.606 0.560 −0.796 −0.343
Wald test (endogenous TFP correlations):
b1,data = b1,model 3.23 (0.07) 0.00 (1.00) 69.44 (0.00) 4.78 (0.03)
b1(data,fixed effects) = b1,model 0.22 (0.64)
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Coefficient estimates reported with t−stat in parentheses.
Wald test reported with p−value in parentheses.
comovement. In particular, the second factor is the most important: countries with strong trade
linkages exhibit a higher correlation of the share of expenditures on domestic goods.
These findings are in sharp contrast to what is implied by the theoretical economy. This is illustrated
in Figure 1. The world economy consists of four countries, so that each country has three trade
partners and the calibration of trade costs is done such that the bilateral trade intensities correspond
21
to the minimum, the maximum and the median observed in the empirical data. The first panel of
the figure shows the relation between GDP correlation and bilateral trade implied by the model.
In turn, panels two, three and four look at each factor in isolation.
The first panel illustrates the trade-comovement puzzle and the three subsequent panels dissect the
puzzle exploiting the factor structure of GDP comovement. Looking at the second panel, there is
no association between trade and the correlation of the TFP shocks. This is by design, as in the
baseline model TFP correlations are fixed. The third panel reveals that the link between trade and
the correlation between each country’s share of expenditure on domestic goods is counterfactually
negative. This is an important factor to explain the trade-comovement puzzle. A productivity shock
in country i implies an increase in λii. It also raises the real wage in country j, Wj
(
st
)
/Pj
(
st
)
,
because country j enjoys lower import prices. From equation (17), this in turn implies that λjj
must fall. This effect is more pronounced when trade integration is high. Thus, the model implies
a negative link between trade integration and cor
(
λ˜ii, λ˜jj
)
. This counterfactual implication is key
to understanding the trade-comovement puzzle. Finally, looking at the fourth panel, the small
positive association between trade and comovement is driven by the third component: an increase
in trade is associated with a lower correlation between a country’s TFP and the foreign country’s
share of expenditure on domestic goods. This is at odds with the empirical results which show that
the third channel is not statistically significant.10
These results are also shown in Table 4. Panel A reports the empirical regression between GDP
correlation and bilateral trade, and also the regressions studying the association between trade
intensity and each separate factor. Panel B shows the same regression coefficients as in Panel A,
but reported for our baseline model and, thus, contains the results described above. In particular,
the failure of the model to account for the relation between trade and the correlation of each
country’s share of expenditure on domestic goods is evident.
10Recall from Result 2 that there are three channels through which trade intensity may increase business cycle
correlations: (i) increased bilateral trade resulting in a higher correlation between each country’s technology shocks;
(ii) increased bilateral trade resulting in a higher correlation between each country’s share of expenditure on domestic
goods; and (iii) increased bilateral trade reducing the correlation between the share of expenditure on domestic goods
and foreign technology shocks. In Figure 1 we show that the first channel is absent by design and the second channel
is at odds with Result 2. The third channel is the only one that works in the direction postulated in Result 2.
However, this is the channel which is not significant empirically.
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4.3 Endogenous TFP Correlations
In the baseline model, the correlation of the TFP shocks is fixed for all country pairs at a level that
matches the median correlation in the data. However, this is counterfactual as there is evidence
that countries with stronger trade linkages also have more correlated TFP shocks.11 Therefore,
we now depart from the baseline model and allow for the correlation of the TFP shocks to vary
with trade. We do this by using the estimated regression equation (32) to predict the level of TFP
correlations given the corresponding level of bilateral trade and calibrating the covariance matrix
of the TFP shocks accordingly.
The results are shown in Panel C and D of Table 4. In Panel C, the same regression coefficients
as in Panel A are reported for the theoretical economy with endogenous TFP correlations; Panel
D, reports a Wald test for the null hypothesis that the coefficient estimated using empirical data
is equal to the coefficient implied by the theoretical model with endogenous TFP correlations.
Once we allow for endogenous TFP correlations, the model is able to better replicate the trade-
comovement relation. The implied coefficient in the regression between GDP correlation and trade
intensity is 0.065, which is roughly 65% of the empirical counterpart. In fact, at the 5% level, we
are unable to reject the hypothesis that the estimated coefficient is equal to the value implied by
the model. The p−value for this null hypothesis is 7%. If we consider the estimated coefficient
from the fixed effect regression, the p−value is even higher, at 64% (reported in the last row of
Table 4). Thus, allowing for endogenous TFP correlations helps to resolve the trade-comovement
puzzle. This finding is consistent with those by Kose and Yi (2006). However, given the factor
structure of GDP comovement derived earlier, we can inspect the mechanism further and look at
how each of the three factors that explain GDP comovement is affected by bilateral trade.
In what follows we focus on columns two, three and four of Panel C in Table 4. The results in
column two simply clarify the calibration strategy: in the regression between TFP correlations and
trade, the model implied coefficients are the same as the empirical coefficients by construction.
Our main finding is reported in column three: the model with endogenous TFP correlations still
implies a negative association between bilateral trade and the correlation between each country’s
11See, for instance, Kose and Yi (2006) and Liao and Santacreu (2015).
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Figure 2: trade and comovement (endogenous TFP correlations)
share of expenditure on domestic goods, with a coefficient equal to −0.115.12 This is counterfactual
since empirically there is a positive link between trade and the correlation between each country’s
share of expenditure on domestic goods, with a regression coefficient equal to 0.074. Finally, the
behavior of the third factor is consistent with the empirical data: higher trade intensity lowers the
correlation between foreign TFP shocks and the share of expenditure on domestic goods.13
The main empirical result is well illustrated in Figure 2. Although allowing for TFP correlations
to increase with bilateral trade as in the data helps the model to account for the trade comovement
relationship (shown in the first graph), it leads to a strong counterfactual negative association
between the correlation of the share of expenditure on domestic goods and bilateral trade (shown in
the third graph). This negative association is smaller than in the baseline model with uncorrelated
12Interestingly, the relation between bilateral trade and cor
(
λ˜ii, λ˜jj
)
implied by the model is not monotonic. In
Section 4.5 we look more carefully at the determinants of this relationship in the theoretical model.
13This last mechanism is less important to us because the link between trade intensity and the correlation between
foreign TFP shocks and the share of expenditure on domestic goods is not statistically significant in the empirical
regression.
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Table 5: Decomposing the trade-comovement puzzle
Panel A: baseline model
overall β × (b1,model − b1,data)
gap = −0.096 b1,model − b1,data β β × (b1,model − b1,data) in % of overall gap
cor
(
A˜i, A˜j
)
−0.061 0.135 −0.008 8%
cor
(
λ˜ii, λ˜jj
)
−0.245 0.320 −0.078 81%
cor
(
λ˜ii, A˜j
)
−0.074 −0.282 0.021 −22%
Panel B: endogenous TFP correlations
overall β × (b1,model − b1,data)
gap = −0.038 b1,model − b1,data β β × (b1,model − b1,data) in % of overall gap
cor
(
A˜i, A˜j
)
0.000 0.135 0.000 0%
cor
(
λ˜ii, λ˜jj
)
−0.189 0.320 −0.060 158%
cor
(
λ˜ii, A˜j
)
−0.021 −0.282 0.006 −16%
shocks, which suggests that the presence of correlated TFP shocks helps but it is not enough to
resolve the trade-comovement puzzle.
4.4 Trade-comovement puzzle: counterfactuals
As a final step to understand the trade-comovement puzzle, we develop develop a decomposi-
tion that assesses the quantitative importance of each of the three channels, based on the factor
structure (30).14 We compute the difference between the model implied b1 coefficients in equa-
tions (32), (33) and (34), and their respective empirical counterparts. These differences are shown
in the first column of Table 5. Next, we multiply these differences by the factor loading βr, for
each factor, r = 1, 2, 3, in equation (30). This product is reported in the third column. It provides
an estimate of how much the gap between the empirical trade-comovement coefficient in the FR
regression (31) and its theoretical counterpart can be closed if we consider the counterfactuals in
which we exactly match the relation between one of the three factors and bilateral trade, everything
14We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this decomposition analysis.
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else staying the same.
In Panel A of Table 5 considers the decomposition for the baseline model. The OLS coefficient in
the FR regression (31) is 0.103 and the corresponding coefficient from the baseline model is 0.007.
Thus, the overall gap to overcome is −0.096. Looking at the first row of Panel A, we find that the
counterfactual relation between trade and the TFP correlation is contributing 0.008 points to the
trade-comovement gap (corresponding to 8% of the overall gap). In the second row of Panel A, we
find that the counterfactual relation between trade and the correlation in the share of expenditure
in domestic goods yields 0.078 points to the trade-comovement gap (corresponding to 81% of the
overall gap). In turn, the third factor is not contributing to the trade-comovement puzzle and,
instead, lowers by 22% the gap between the empirical relation and the theoretical counterpart.
In Panel B of Table 5, we consider the model with endogenous TFP correlations. When we do this,
we eliminate entirely the contribution of the first factor to the trade-comovement puzzle and we
find that the overall gap falls (in absolute value) from −0.096 to −0.038. Thus, we close roughly
2/3 of the gap, which is substantially more than the 8% contribution from the first factor, reported
in Panel A. This happens for two reasons. First, as we make the TFP correlations endogenous,
the other factors are also affected. In particular, the contribution of the first factor changes from
−0.078 to −0.060 (as reported in the second row of Panel B). Second, this exercise indicates that the
theoretical model attributes too much importance to the first factor relative to the data (while the
empirical factor loading is β1 = 0.135, its theoretical counterpart is 1.041). Thus, despite closing
2/3 of the overall gap in the trade-comovement link, the model still implies a strong counterfactual
relation between trade and the correlation of the share of expenditure in domestic goods. This
is another way to illustrate the main result in our paper: when we allow for endogenous TFP
correlations, the trade-comovement relationship implied by the model is closer to its empirical
counterpart, but for the wrong reasons.
These findings suggest that both empirical and theoretical research should examine further the
positive association between trade and the comovement in the share of expenditure on domestic
goods. Empirically, this channel is the most important to explain why trade leads to business
cycle synchronization. Therefore, we argue that this should constitute a litmus test for theoretical
models: stronger trade linkages should lead to synchronization in the share of expenditure in
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domestic goods.
4.5 Inspecting the Mechanism: Bilateral Trade and cor
(
λ˜ii, λ˜jj
)
The relation between bilateral trade and cor
(
λ˜ii, λ˜jj
)
implied by the model with endogenous TFP
correlations is not monotonic. As shown in the third graph of Figure 2, as we move from low levels
of bilateral trade to intermediate levels, cor
(
λ˜ii, λ˜jj
)
increases. After that, as we move to high
levels of bilateral trade, it falls again. Therefore, it is important to inspect the mechanism more
carefully.15 We do this by looking at impulse response functions (IRFs) conditional on a TFP
shock, for each component of λ˜ii.
16 In particular, we start from equation (9) to obtain
λj1
(
st
)
λjj (st)
=
[
W1
(
st
)
Wj (st)
]−θ
τ−θj1 . (35)
In log-deviations from steady state equation (35) takes the form
λ˜jj,t = θ
(
W˜1,t − W˜j,t
)
+ λ˜j1,t, (36)
where an increase in
(
W˜1,t − W˜j,t
)
in equation (36) represents an improvement in the terms-of-
trade of country 1 vis-a`-vis country j, while λ˜j1,t corresponds to country j’s import ratio from
country 1.17 A positive technology shock in country 1 (hereafter, the Home country) raises Home’s
share of expenditure on domestic goods, λ˜11,t. We now ask, under what circumstances does the
share of expenditure on domestic goods also increase in other countries?
From equation (36) we see that, for the share of expenditure on domestic goods to increase in
countries j = 2, 3, 4 (henceforth, the Foreign countries) conditional on a positive TFP shock at
Home, either the Home terms-of-trade must improve or the Foreign’s import penetration ratio must
increase. The IRFs in Figure 3 show that these two terms move in opposite directions: a positive
15In Appendix G we examine the implications of this non-monotonicity when the country pairs with low bilateral
trade intensity are more predominant.
16We obtain the IRFs for the baseline model with exogenous TFP correlations to avoid confounding factors in the
interpretation of the transmission mechanism of TFP shocks. Thus, the IRFs show the response of each variable
following a Home TFP shock, with Foreign’s TFP constant.
17From equation (4), changes in the price of country i exports are given by p˜ji,t = W˜i,t, and so
(
W˜i,t − W˜j,t
)
captures changes in the terms-of-trade.
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Figure 3: inspecting the mechanism (IRF to a TFP shock at Home)
TFP shock at Home worsens Home’s terms-of-trade while raising the Foreign’s import penetration
ratio. The overall effect on Foreign’s share of expenditure on domestic goods is ambiguous.
From the IRFs in the bottom-right panel of Figure 3 we see that for the Foreign countries with
high and median trade costs the two effects almost cancel out and, hence, a TFP shock at Home
has almost no effect on those countries’ share of expenditure on domestic goods. Instead, for the
Foreign country with low trade costs the deterioration in the Home’s terms-of-trade dominates and,
hence, the Foreign’s share of expenditure on domestic goods falls. In Appendix B we show that
the direct impact of changes in the terms-of-trade on the Foreign import ratio from Home depends
on the bilateral trade flow in the following way:
∂λ˜j1,t
∂
(
W˜1,t − W˜j,t
) = −θ (1− λ¯j1) , (37)
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and, combining (36) with (37), we obtain
∂λ˜jj,t
∂
(
W˜1,t − W˜j,t
) = θλ¯j1. (38)
Therefore, the deterioration in Home’s terms-of-trade implies counterfactually that, conditional on
a positive Home TFP shock, the correlation between the Home and the Foreign share of expenditure
on domestic goods falls with increased trade integration (measured by λ¯j1). The strength of this
effect depends on θ: with higher θ, implying less firm heterogeneity, the counterfactual effect is
larger.18
The parameter θ is calibrated to 3.60 following empirical evidence in Bernard et al. (2003). The
upshot is that given the median bilateral trade flow of 1.5%, the elasticity of the domestic expendi-
ture share to changes in the terms-of-trade is only 5.4%. Instead, for the maximum bilateral trade
flow observed in the data, which is 39%, the same elasticity is 140.4%. Hence, the fall in the share
of expenditure on domestic goods is much higher for the country with low bilateral trade costs.
This happens despite the deterioration in Home’s terms-of-trade vis-a`-vis the Foreign economies
with median and high trade costs being greater than that vis-a`-vis the Foreign economies with low
trade costs. Given such a large difference in the relative elasticities, allowing for correlated TFP
shocks is not enough to overthrow this result.
The inability of the model to generate the observed relation between trade and the synchronization
of the share of expenditure on domestic goods follows from the behavior of the terms-of-trade.
Indeed, our model possesses the feature, common to most IRBC models, that Home TFP gains are
transmitted positively to the trade partners through a deterioration of Home’s terms-of-trade.19
This property of the IRBC models is often counterfactual as shown in Corsetti et al. (2008) and,
using an alternative identification scheme, in Corsetti et al. (2014). However, the elasticity of the
18It is interesting to note that this elasticity does not depend on the elasticity of substitution across varieties, σ.
19An exception to this feature is Ghironi and Melitz (2005) who construct a model where the entry of new pro-
ducers and varieties in the Home economy following a TFP shock may dampen or even reverse the deterioration in
the terms-of-trade. This is an important example, as the Ghironi and Melitz (2005) model is consistent with the
factor decomposition for cross-country output correlation proposed in this paper. Thus, it is in principle possible
to develop microfoundations which are consistent with our factor model, and be able to reproduce the empirical
trade-comovement relation. For example, Cacciatore (2014) builds on Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and adds search and
matching frictions in the labor market. These labor market frictions turn out to be important to explain business
cycle synchronization.
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share of expenditure on domestic goods to changes in the terms-of-trade is increasing in the level of
trade integration. The upshot is that the only mechanism compatible with increased comovement in
the share of expenditure on domestic goods following greater trade integration requires procyclical
terms-of-trade.
5 Sensitivity Analysis
In this Section we investigate the sensitivity of our findings to changes in the assumptions about
the structure of financial markets, the intertemporal substitution in labor supply choices, and the
inclusion of physical capital in production.
5.1 Financial Autarky
Our baseline model assumed complete financial markets. However, Heathcote and Perri (2002) show
that IRBC models with financial autarky match better some key business cycle moments, compared
to the same models under complete markets. The factor structure of GDP comovement obtained
earlier holds irrespective of the structure of financial markets, allowing us to investigate how each
factor that determines the link between trade and comovement behaves under the assumption of
financial autarky and, hence, balanced trade period by period. With financial autarky, Di
(
st
)
= 0
for each history st, and equations (11) and (20) become
Pi
(
st
)
Ci
(
st
)
= Wi
(
st
)
Li
(
st
)
, (39)
Wi
(
st
)
Li
(
st
)
=
n∑
j=1
λji
(
st
) [
Wj
(
st
)
Lj
(
st
)]
, (40)
respectively. Equations (23) and (24) are no longer relevant. We solve the version of the model in
which the correlation of the TFP shocks varies with trade. The results are shown in Panel A of
Table 6 and should be compared to the results in Table 4.
The results under financial autarky are very similar to those under complete markets. In particular,
the business cycle synchronization effect of trade is entirely driven by the correlation of the TFP
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shocks and the effect of trade on the second factor, cor
(
λ˜ii, λ˜jj
)
, is again counterfactual. The
muted role of the financial market structure is unsurprising in a model featuring GHH preferences.
When intertemporal substitution in labor supply is absent, capital flows do not affect the economy’s
aggregate labor supply through the income effect. For this reason, in what follows we explore what
happens if we allow for intertemporal substitution in labor supply choices.
5.2 Intertemporal Substitution in Labor Supply
We allow for intertemporal substitution in labor supply by introducing preferences of the form
u
(
Ci, Li; s
t
)
= lnCi
(
st
)
−
Li
(
st
)1+1/σn
1 + 1/σn
. (41)
We refer to the iso-elastic preferences in (41) as the KPR preferences.20 Instead of (15), the new
intratemporal condition determining the choice between leisure and consumption is
Li
(
st
)
=
[
1
Ci (st)
W
(
st
)
Pi (st)
]σn
. (42)
Under financial autarky, equation (39) holds, and consumption corresponds to labor income. Given
the preferences form (41), after an increase in the real wage the income and substitution effects
exactly offset one another, with the upshot that the aggregate labor supply is endogenously fixed
and there are no transmission dynamics.21 Therefore, we will focus on the economy under complete
markets.
With the alternative preferences, the factor structure (30) still holds approximately.22 Thus, we
examine how allowing for intertemporal substitution in labor supply changes the link between the
level of bilateral trade and each factor. The model is solved under the assumption of endogenous
TFP correlations. The results are shown in Panel B of Table 6 and should be compared to the
results in Table 4.
With KPR preferences the model is less successful at replicating the relation between trade and
20After King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988).
21This is easily seen from combining conditions (39) and (42).
22The factor structure holds exactly for the approximate solution obtained using log-linearization methods, as we
do in this paper. See appendix H for details.
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Table 6: Trade and business cycle synchronization (additional experiments)
dependent variable
cor
(
Y˜i, Y˜j
)
cor
(
A˜i, A˜j
)
cor
(
λ˜ii, λ˜jj
)
cor
(
λ˜ii, A˜j
)
1. 2. 3. 4.
Panel A – model: financial autarky
log
(
Bilateral Trade
)
0.066 0.061 −0.128 −0.060
constant 0.604 0.560 −0.848 −0.422
Panel B – model: KPR preferences
log
(
Bilateral Trade
)
0.053 0.061 −0.090 −0.013
constant 0.471 0.560 −0.696 −0.268
Panel C – model: capital in production
log
(
Bilateral Trade
)
−0.015 −0.021 −0.159 −0.069
constant 0.396 0.336 −0.974 −0.436
In both panel A and panel B, the model is solved assuming endogenous TFP correlations.
In panel B and panel C, the model is solved under complete markets.
comovement. The OLS coefficient of the regression between output correlation and trade is lowered,
equal to 0.053. This is less than the imposed OLS coefficient of the regression between TFP
correlations and trade. Thus, under KPR preferences the labor adjustment goes opposite the effect
of TFP synchronization, eliminating some of its effect on GDP comovement. Thus, intertemporal
substitution in labor supply is unhelpful to solve the trade-comovement puzzle. The reason for this
is found by inspecting Figure 4, which shows the IRFs for employment under the two alternative
preference forms.23 Under GHH preferences, there is no intertemporal substitution in labor supply.
Therefore, following a positive TFP shock in country 1, employment increases in all the countries.
This is because the lower price of goods imported from country 1 raises the real wage everywhere.
This positive effect is more pronounced when trade costs are low, implying a positive link between
23The IRFs are for the model without endogenous TFP correlations, since the goal is to show the effect of intertem-
poral substitution in labor supply.
32
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
quarters
Employment (GHH preferences)
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
quarters
Employment (KPR preferences)
Home
WL
WM
WH
Home
WL
WM
WH
Figure 4: employment (alternative preferences)
employment comovement and bilateral trade.
Instead, with intertemporal substitution in labor supply and complete markets, a positive TFP
shock in country 1 leads to an increase in foreign consumption implied by the risk-sharing condition.
Therefore, under complete markets, intertemporal substitution in labor supply generates negative
comovement in employment. This counterfactual feature is not specific to our model and is a
very general and well known property of the standard IRBC model (Baxter and Crucini, 1995).
Under complete markets, the increase in foreign consumption following the TFP shock in country 1,
implied by the risk-sharing condition, dwarfs the substitution effect implied by the increase in the
foreign real wage. This dampening effect is more pronounced when trade costs are low, implying a
negative link between employment comovement and bilateral trade.
By contrast, with GHH preferences, there is no income effect on labor supply, which results in
a positive international comovement of employment increasing with the level of bilateral trade.
Thus, for endogenous labor supply to help solve the trade-comovement puzzle, GHH preferences
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are a desirable feature. Moreover, the model with GHH preferences also yields substantially larger
employment volatility for the same labor supply elasticity parameter. This can be seen from the
magnitudes of the IRF coefficients in Figure 4, which are much larger for the GHH model. These
results are consistent with work by Raffo (2008), showing that GHH preferences help matching the
business cycle dynamics of consumption and net exports.
5.3 Capital in Production
Our baseline model does not include physical capital in production, similarly to the set-up in EK
and Ghironi and Melitz (2005). Here, we establish that the factor structure (30) also holds in the
model with capital in production and we investigate how the trade-comovement link is affected by
the inclusion of productive capital.
Let each intermediate commodity be produced using the following Cobb-Douglas technology
yi
(
v, st
)
= Zi
(
st
) [
ϕi,vKi
(
v, st−1
)α
Li
(
v, st
)1−α]
, (43)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is the capital income share and Zi
(
st
)
is an aggregate productivity shock. The
capital is rented from the household sector and the rental rate for capital is ri
(
st
)
. As a result, the
marginal cost of producing intermediate commodity v in country i to be delivered in country j is
pji
(
v, st
)
=
[
ri
(
st
)α
Wi
(
st
)1−α
κZi (st)ϕi,v
]
τji, (44)
with κ = αα (1− α)1−α. With competitive factor and good’s markets, the capital income and labor
income shares are, respectively, given by
αPi
(
st
)
Yi
(
st
)
= ri
(
st
)
Ki
(
st−1
)
, (45)
(1− α)Pi
(
st
)
Yi
(
st
)
=Wi
(
st
)
Li
(
st
)
. (46)
The household sector purchases the non-traded final good for either consumption or investment in
physical capital, and the stand-in household’s budget constraint is now given by
Pi
(
st
)
Ci
(
st
)
+Pi
(
st
)
Ii
(
st
)
=Wi
(
st
)
Li
(
st
)
+ ri
(
st
)
Ki
(
st−1
)
+Di
(
st
)
, (47)
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Figure 5: trade and comovement (capital in production)
where Ii
(
st
)
= K
(
st
)
− (1− δ)K
(
st−1
)
, with δ ∈ (0, 1), the capital depreciation rate. Therefore,
with investment in physical capital there is an additional Euler equation, given by
µi
(
st
)
= β
∑
st+1∈S
pi
(
st+1|s
t
)
µi
(
st+1
) [
ri
(
st+1
)
+ (1− δ)
]
. (48)
In the set-up with capital, the share of expenditure by country j in country i goods is given by
λji
(
st
)
=
[
κri
(
st
)α
Wi
(
st
)1−α
τji
κZi (st)Pi (st)
]−θ
, (49)
and the ideal price index in country j is still given by (7), but with
Φj
(
st
)
=
n∑
i=1
[
ri
(
st
)α
Wi
(
st
)1−α
τji
κZi (st)
]−θ
. (50)
Finally, total domestic income must be equal to total expenditure in domestic goods, as follows
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Figure 6: investment and productivity (capital in production)
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(
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. (51)
The other equilibrium conditions are as in the baseline model. We establish the following result:
Result 3 The factor structure of real GDP comovement given in equation (30) holds in the model
with capital in production, with the difference that A˜i,t is not the exogenous total factor productivity
but, instead, is the aggregate average productivity of labor (APL), and is an endogenous variable
that depends on the capital-labor ratio, as follows
A˜i,t = Z˜i,t + α
(
K˜i,t−1 − L˜i,t
)
. (52)
In Appendix I, Result 3 is proven, and all the equilibrium conditions in log-linear form are provided.
Next, we look at how the quantitative results are affected by the inclusion of capital in production.
In the results we show, the capital share is set to α = 0.33 and the depreciation rate to δ = 0.05. The
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results are reported in Panel C of Table 6. The main finding, is that the trade-comovement puzzle
is more pronounced in the model with capital in production. In particular, the correlation between
trade and output synchronization is negative and the association between the APL correlation and
trade also turns negative. Figure 5 shows how all three factors behave in a way not consistent with
the data.
The reason for this has to do with the resource-shifting problem that has been identified by Kose
and Yi (2006), whereby greater trade linkages lead to capital and other resources shifting to the
country that receives the favorable productivity shock. This is illustrated in the first panel of
Figure 6, that shows the IRF for investment after a TFP shock in the Home country. We find that,
on impact, investment in Home increases, while investment in the nearest trade partner (for which
bilateral trade costs are low) falls by roughly half the same amount. Instead, investment in the
countries not closely integrated with the Home country increases. The reduction in investment in
the nearest trade partner implies that average labor productivity falls relative to the average labor
productivity in the other countries, since APL is a function of the capital-labor ratio. This result,
which amplifies the trade-comovement puzzle in the model with capital in production is shown in
the second panel of Figure 6.
6 Conclusion
Substantial empirical evidence suggests that countries or regions with stronger trade linkages have
more correlated business cycles. However, from a theoretical perspective the IRBC model has
difficulties in replicating this empirical fact. This has given rise to the so-called trade-comovement
puzzle: standard models are unable to generate high output correlations arising from high bilateral
trade intensity.
In this paper, we examine the sources of the trade-comovement puzzle. We show that within a large
class of trade models (that includes the Armington model; Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Bernard et
al., 2003; Krugman, 1980; and multiple versions of Melitz, 2003), there are three channels through
which bilateral trade may increase business cycle synchronization: (i) if trade raises the correlation
between each country’s technology shocks; (ii) if trade leads to higher correlation between each
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country’s share of expenditure on domestic goods; and (iii) if trade lowers the correlation between
the share of expenditure on domestic goods and foreign TFP. Although the baseline model used
to obtain this decomposition does not include capital in production, we show that a model with
capital in production yields the same factor structure, with aggregate ALP replacing TFP.
Using bilateral trade data in manufactures for a panel of 21 OECD countries we find that the first
and second channels are supported by the data: higher bilateral trade intensity is associated with
higher TFP correlations and with a higher correlation between each country’s share of expenditure
on domestic goods. Consistent with the results of Kose and Yi (2006), we find that allowing
for correlated TFP shocks is part of the solution to the trade-comovement puzzle. However, we
show that even allowing for correlated shocks, the model still implies a counterfactual relation
between bilateral trade and each country’s correlation of the share of expenditure on domestic
goods. Therefore, simply allowing for correlated shocks is not a satisfactory solution to the trade-
comovement puzzle. Instead, our findings suggests that both the empirical and theoretical research
should examine the sources of the positive association between trade and the comovement in the
share of expenditure on domestic goods.
This invites more research to uncover new trade related transmission mechanisms of productivity
shocks. A candidate ingredient for such models includes endogenous firm entry dynamics in settings
with firm heterogeneity, in line with the framework of Ghironi and Melitz (2005). In their model,
following a transitory productivity shock in the Home country, there is an increase in the number of
new domestic firms. This raises domestic labor demand, softening the terms-of-trade deterioration,
and may even lead to their improvement. Moreover, the transitory productivity shock also lowers
the productivity threshold for firms to export; thus, the average productivity of exporters falls,
which increases the average price of Home’s exports. This is reinforced further if productivity
shocks are combined with efficiency gains in setting up new firms, as shown in Corsetti, Martin,
and Pesenti (2007), or if there are labor market frictions, as in Cacciatore (2014).
Another candidate mechanism to solve the trade-comovement puzzle, as shown in Drozd et al.
(2014), are models featuring dynamic trade elasticities and, in particular, large long-run elasticities
and small short-run elasticities. This is because, with large long-run elasticities, it is possible to
match the cross-sectional dispersion in bilateral trade flows with less dispersion of the trade cost
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parameters. This makes high bilateral trade intensity more compatible with synchronization in the
share of expenditure on domestic goods because it is possible to obtain high bilateral trade flows
with relatively high trade costs (weakening the resource-shifting channel). As argued by Drozd et
al. (2014), a model of dynamic trade elasticities can be micro-founded using product market search
frictions a` la Drozd and Nosal (2012). Therefore, future work should evaluate the quantitative
implications of both mechanisms (endogenous entry dynamics and search frictions) to match the
data, in the context of the factor structure representation we propose in this paper.
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APPENDIX
A Steady State Equilibrium
Let X¯ denote the steady state level for the variable X. We consider a symmetric deterministic
steady state equilibrium with λ¯ii, W¯i, P¯i, C¯i and L¯i equal for all i. Moreover, in the symmetric
equilibrium there are no trade deficits, so that D¯i = 0 for all i. The symmetry assumption makes
it possible to solve analytically for the steady state. We measure everything in units of labor and,
hence, W¯ = 1. Combining equations (7), (8) and (9) yields that in a symmetric steady state
equilibrium, λ¯ii is given by
λ¯ =
 n∑
j=1
τ−θij
−1 . (A.1)
Substituting in (18) for λ¯ using (A.1) yields
L¯ = κ−σn
 n∑
j=1
τ−θij
σn/θ . (A.2)
Making use of (9) to solve for the price level yields
P¯ = κ
 n∑
j=1
τ−θij
−1/θ . (A.3)
Using the fact that in the steady state equilibrium there are no trade deficits so that P¯C¯ = W¯ L¯,
yields the steady state level of consumption
C¯ = κ−(1+σn)
 n∑
j=1
τ−θij
(1+σn)/θ . (A.4)
Finally, equation (16) yields the steady state marginal utility of wealth
µ¯ =
[
P¯
(
C¯ −
L¯1+1/σn
1 + 1/σn
)]−1
. (A.5)
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B Log-linear Equilibrium Conditions
Following standard steps, the individual optimality conditions and the market clearing conditions
are log-linearized around the symmetric deterministic steady state equilibrium and combined so as
to characterize the equilibrium dynamics. We consider all the variables in log-deviation except for
the trade deficit which is considered in levels since the trade deficit must be zero in steady state.
Let X˜i,t denote the variable Xi
(
st
)
in log-deviation from steady state and Di,t =
(
P¯C¯
)−1
D
(
st
)
denote the ratio between the trade deficit at date t and the steady state income. The nume´raire is
taken to be labor in country 1, so that W˜1,t = 0 for all t. The log-linear equilibrium conditions are
the following
µ˜t + P˜i,t = −P¯µ¯
(
C¯C˜i,t − L¯
1+1/σnL˜i,t
)
, ∀ i = 1, . . . , n, (B.1)
µ˜t = R˜t + Et (µ˜t+1) , (B.2)
P˜i,t + A˜i,t = λ¯
n∑
j=1
W˜j,tτ
−θ
ij , (B.3)
λ˜ji,t = −θ
(
W˜i,t − P˜j,t − A˜j,t
)
, (B.4)
L˜i,t = σn
(
W˜i,t − P˜i,t
)
, (B.5)
W˜i,t + L˜i,t =
n∑
j=1
λ¯ji
(
λ˜ji,t + W˜j,t + L˜j,t +Dj,t
)
, (B.6)
P˜i,t + C˜i,t = W˜i,t + L˜i,t +Di,t, (B.7)
n∑
i=0
Di
(
st
)
= 0. (B.8)
45
Finally, in Section 4 we make use of equation (37). To obtain this equation, combine (B.3) and (B.4)
to obtain
λ˜ji,t = −θ
(
W˜i,t − λ¯
n∑
l=1
W˜l,tτ
−θ
jl
)
= −θ
[(
W˜i,t − W˜j,t
)
+ λ¯W˜j
n∑
l=1
τ−θjl − λ¯
n∑
l=1
W˜l,tτ
−θ
jl
]
= −θ
[(
W˜i,t − W˜j,t
)
− λ¯
n∑
l=1
(
W˜l,t − W˜j,t
)
τ−θjl
]
,
(B.9)
where we have used the fact that λ¯ =
(
n∑
l=1
τ−θjl
)−1
.
The upshot is that
∂λ˜j1,t
∂
(
W˜1,t − W˜j,t
) = −θ (1− λ¯τ−θj1 )
= −θ
(
1− λ¯j1
)
,
(B.10)
where we have used the fact that λ¯ji = λ¯τ
−θ
ji . This corresponds to equation (37) in the main text.
C Proof of Result 1
If assumptions A1 and A2 are satisfied, the results in Arkolakis et al. (2012) imply that the following
gravity equation holds
λji
(
st
)
=
[
κWi
(
st
)
τji
Aj (st)Pj (st)
]−θ
, (C.1)
where κ is a constant parameter and Pj
(
st
)
= A
(
st
)−1 [∫ 1
0 pj
(
n, st
)1−σ
dn
]1/(1−σ)
is the aggregate
price level. Solving for the real wage we obtain
Wi
(
st
)
Pj (st)
=
A
(
st
)
κ
[
1
λjj (st)
]1/θ
. (C.2)
From assumption A3, it follows that the labor supply is a function only of the real wage, so that
Li
(
st
)
=
[
Wi
(
st
)
Pj (st)
]σn
, (C.3)
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where σn is the labor supply elasticity. The value added by each intermediate firm is equal to the
sum of that firm’s wage bill and profits, so that
pi
(
v, st
)
yi
(
v, st
)
=Wi
(
st
)
Li
(
v, st
)
+Πi
(
v, st
)
, (C.4)
where Πi
(
v, st
)
are profits for the intermediate firm producing variety v.24 From assumption A2
profits are a constant share γ of revenues, so that Πj
(
v, st
)
= γpi
(
v, st
)
yi
(
v, st
)
. It follows that
Yi
(
st
)
≡
∫
Ωi(st)
pi
(
v, s0
)
yi
(
v, st
)
dv = (1− γ)−1
∫
Ωi(st)
[
pi
(
v, s0
)
pi (v, st)
]
Wi
(
st
)
Li
(
v, st
)
dv. (C.5)
Making use of (C.1) and (C.2) yields
Yi
(
st
)
= κ−σnAi
(
st
)1+σn [ 1
λii (st)
]σn/θ
, (C.6)
where we have substituted for prices following the same steps described in Section 3.1. The upshot
is that output in log-deviations from steady state is given by equation (29) as had to be shown.
D Proof of Result 2
From equation (29), GDP fluctuations in country i (in log-deviations from steady state) are given
by
Y˜i,t = (1 + σn) A˜i,t −
(σn
θ
)
λ˜ii,t. (D.1)
It follows that the covariance between the logarithm of output in country i and in country j is
cov
(
Y˜i, Y˜j
)
= ϑ1 cov
(
A˜i, A˜j
)
+ ϑ2 cov
(
λ˜ii, λ˜jj
)
+ ϑ3
[
cov
(
λ˜ii, Aj
)
+ cov
(
λ˜jj , Aj
)]
, (D.2)
where ϑ1 = (1 + σn)
2, ϑ2 = (σn/θ)
2 and ϑ3 = − (1 + σn) (σn/θ). In a symmetric world economy
var (Yi), var
(
A˜i
)
and var
(
λ˜ii
)
are the same for all countries and cov
(
λ˜ii, A˜j
)
= cov
(
λ˜jj , A˜j
)
.
The upshot is that by dividing each side of equation (D.2) by var (Yi), and dividing and multiplying
the first term of the RHS by var
(
A˜i
)
, the second term by var
(
λ˜ii
)
and the third term by std (Ai)×
24Note that in our theoretical framework profits are zero because we are considering a model with perfect compe-
tition.
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std
(
λ˜ii
)
yields the equation
cor
(
Y˜i, Y˜j
)
= β1 cor
(
A˜i, A˜j
)
+ β2 cor
(
λ˜ii, λ˜jj
)
+ β3cor
(
λ˜ii, Aj
)
, (D.3)
where the factor loadings are given by
β1 ≡ (1 + σn)
2
var
(
A˜i
)
var
(
Y˜i
)
 , β2 ≡ (σn
θ
)2 var
(
λ˜ii
)
var
(
Y˜i
)
 and
β3 ≡ −2 (1 + σn) (σn/θ)
std
(
A˜i
)
std
(
λ˜ii
)
var
(
Y˜i
)
 .
Result 2 follows immediately from equation (D.3), where the factors (i), (ii) and (iii) are as follows:
(i) the correlation between each country’s TFP; (ii) the correlation between each country’s share of
expenditure on domestic goods; (iii) the correlation between the country’s share of expenditure on
domestic goods and the partner country’s TFP (equal to the negative of the correlation between
the country’s import penetration ratio and the partner country’s technology shocks).
E Data
We consider a sample of 21 OECD countries composed of Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Denmark
(DK), France (FR), Germany (DE), Italy (IT), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Sweden (SW),
Switzerland (CH), Canada (CA), Japan (JP), Finland (FI), Greece (GR), Ireland (IR), Korea (KO),
Portugal (PT), Spain (SP), and New Zealand (NZ) United Kingdom (UK) and the United States
(US), over the period 1988–2007. The variables definitions and data sources are as follows:
Real Output
Real output is measured using manufacturing GDP and CPI data from the OECD STAN database.
Bilateral correlations are calculated using the linearly detrended log real output.
Country’s Share of Expenditure on Domestic Goods
The measure λii is the fraction of total manufacturing expenditure of country i on manufacturing
goods made in country i. The expenditure on goods made at home is measured as the gross
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manufacturing output (converted to dollars using current exchange rates) less total manufacturing
exports. Total manufacturing expenditure is measured as the sum of expenditure on manufacturing
goods made at home and expenditure on total manufacturing imports. All data are obtained from
the OECD STAN database. Bilateral correlations between λii and λjj are calculated from the raw
series of λ’s.
Trade Intensity
We measure trade intensity between each country pair i and j, labeled
(
Bilateral Trade
)
ij
, by
normalizing bilateral trade—that is, the sum of each country’s manufacturing imports from the
other—by the sum of nominal manufacturing GDP in the two countries, averaged over the entire
period. Manufacturing imports data, denominated in dollars, are taken from the OECD STAN
database. We normalize trade by nominal GDP (converted in dollars using current exchange rates),
also from the STAN database.
Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
We measure TFP as the ratio between real manufacturing output and manufacturing employment
obtained from the STAN database.
F Calibration of the Model
The number of countries n is set equal to four, implying six distinct country-pairs. Having six
distinct country-pairs allows us to construct a symmetric world economy matching the minimum,
maximum and median bilateral trade flows observed in the data.
The list of technology parameters that have to be determined includes the following: the elasticity
of substitution between intermediate inputs σ; the parameter that controls the level of heterogeneity
in productive efficiency θ; and the six trade-cost parameters τij for each distinct country pair.
25
The first two parameters are chosen based on evidence in Bernard et al. (2003), who choose
the parameters θ and σ matching the productivity and size advantage of exporters in the U.S.
plant-level data. The parameter θ is chosen to match the productivity advantage of exporters,
25We assume τij = τji and τii = 1.
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and the parameter σ corresponds to the price elasticity of demand for differentiated intermediate
commodities and therefore relates to the size advantage of exporting establishments. The values
estimated by Bernard et al. (2003) for θ and σ are, respectively, 3.60 and 3.79.
The trade-cost parameters τij are chosen to match the minimum, maximum and median bilateral
trade flows observed in the OECD Structural Analysis (STAN) database. To construct a symmetric
world economy, the matrix of trade costs must be symmetric, of the form
T =

1 τL τM τH
τL 1 τH τM
τM τH 1 τL
τH τM τL 1
 , (F.1)
with 1 < τL < τM < τH . We choose τL and τH to match, respectively, the maximum and minimum
bilateral trade flow observed in our data and τM to match the median trade flow. In a symmetric
world economy the bilateral trade flow between two countries i and j is given by λij . Let λmin,
λmax and λmed denote the minimum, maximum and median bilateral trade flows. Then, from the
manipulation of equation (9) we obtain, in the symmetric world economy with n = 4 and W¯ = 1
(labor is the nume´raire) the following relations:
1− λmin − λmax − λmed =
(
1 + τ−θL + τ
−θ
M + τ
−θ
H
)−1
,
τL =
(
λmax
1− λmin − λmax − λmed
)−1/θ
, τH =
(
λmin
1− λmin − λmax − λmed
)−1/θ
,
τM =
(
λmed
1− λmin − λmax − λmed
)−1/θ
.
(F.2)
Thus, given targets for λmin, λmax and λmed it becomes possible to set values for each of the three
trade costs τL, τH and τM . The resulting matrix of trade costs is given by
T =

1.000 1.127 2.801 5.948
1.127 1.000 5.948 2.801
2.801 5.948 1.000 1.127
5.948 2.801 1.127 1.000
 . (F.3)
The remaining technology parameters that need to be chosen are the parameters of the stochastic
process for the technology shocks, A˜i,t, a finite-state Markov process with states and transition
probabilities set to approximate the continuous autoregressive model given by (up to a constant)
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Figure 7: trade and comovement (16 country model)
A˜i,t = ρA˜i,t−1 + Et,
where Et is a normally distributed and zero-mean shock with standard deviation σǫ. We allow the
shocks to be correlated across countries but in the baseline model set the correlation coefficient to be
the same for all country-pairs. This correlation coefficient is chosen to match the median bilateral
correlation of TFP observed in our sample. In one of our additional quantitative experiments we
allow the correlation of TFP shocks across countries to vary with the level of trade between each
country-pair. We choose values for σǫ and ρ to match the standard deviation and the autocorrelation
of output fluctuations in the US. The only preference parameter that must be chosen is the labor
supply elasticity σn. In our baseline calibration we set σn = 1 consistent with the estimates of the
labor supply elasticity using macro data.
G Results Based on Model With 16 countries
In this section we consider a calibrated world economy of 16 countries (120 trade partners), and
conduct two alternative experiments: Experiment 1, where each country has bilateral trade intensity
with 13 partners equal to the median bilateral trade intensity in the data, it has bilateral trade
intensity with one partner equal to the minimum bilateral trade intensity in the data, and it has
51
Table 7: Trade and business cycle synchronization (16 country model)
dependent variable
cor
(
Y˜i, Y˜j
)
cor
(
A˜i, A˜j
)
cor
(
λ˜ii, λ˜jj
)
cor
(
λ˜ii, A˜j
)
1. 2. 3. 4.
Panel A – model: 16 countries (experiment 1)
log
(
Bilateral Trade
)
0.064 0.061 −0.061 0.006
constant 0.604 0.560 −0.334 −0.023
Panel B – model: 16 countries (experiment 2)
log
(
Bilateral Trade
)
0.064 0.061 −0.042 0.008
constant 0.598 0.566 −0.294 −0.006
In both Panel A and Panel B the model is solved assuming endogenous TFP correlations.
In Panel B the model is solved under complete markets.
bilateral trade intensity with one partner equal to the maximum bilateral trade intensity in the data;
Experiment 2, where each country has low bilateral trade with 7 countries, the median bilateral
trade with 7 countries, and high bilateral trade with just one partner.
Panel A of Figure 7 shows the distribution of log bilateral trade used in Experiment 1 and contrasts
it to the actual empirical distribution. The results concerning trade and comovement are shown
in Panel A of Table 7 and should be contrasted to Table 4. The findings are virtually identical to
the baseline results. This happens because the distribution of the logarithm of bilateral trade is
roughly symmetric (as shown in Figure 7), meaning that most country-pairs have bilateral trade
in logs equal to the median value, with symmetric tales.26 However, findings may change if we
oversample countries with low bilateral trade intensity.
This is the purpose of Experiment 2. Panel B of Figure 7 shows the distribution of log bilateral trade
used in Experiment 2, where each country has low bilateral trade with 7 countries, median bilateral
26Of course, bilateral trade in levels is strongly right skewed, with most country pairs trading very little.
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Figure 8: trade and comovement (16 country model)
trade with another 7 countries and high bilateral trade with a single country. This experiment is
relevant if the relationship between log bilateral trade and comovement is non-linear and if bilateral
trade bellow the median is very predominant in the data, which to a certain extent is true (the
empirical distribution of log bilateral trade is not exactly symmetric and is slightly right skewed).
By oversampling the minimum bilateral trade, we are giving the best possible chance to this non-
linearity. The results are shown in Panel B of Table 7. They reveal that the non-linearity is
unimportant to explain the link between bilateral trade in logs and output correlation and, in
particular, the FR coefficient is virtually unaffected, at 0.064. The only factor for which the
non-linearity plays a role concerns the correlation of the share of expenditure on domestic goods.
However, the relation with trade is still counterfactual, at −0.042.
These findings are represented graphically in Figure 8, that reproduces the scatter plots in Figure 2,
but with the dots of the model based observations represented in different sizes, proportional to
the frequency of their sampling. The regression lines represented correspond to the estimated
regression equations and, hence, take into account the oversampling of countries with low bilateral
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trade flows. It is apparent from the Figure that the results are not strongly affected by the implied
non-linearity.
H Factor Structure With Alternative Preferences
The purpose of this Section is to show that when the preferences allow for intertemporal substitution
in labor supply the factor structure (30) still holds for the model solved using log-linearization
methods around the deterministic steady state.
When the preferences are of the form in (41), the optimality condition determining the choice
between leisure and consumption can be written in log-linear form, as follows
L˜i,t = σn
(
W˜i,t − P˜i,t − C˜i,t
)
. (H.1)
where X˜i,t denotes the variable X
(
st
)
in log-deviation from steady state.
If the model is solved using log-linearization methods, the resulting approximate policy functions
are linear functions of the state vector, st. In particular, the approximate policy functions for the
choice of hours worked and consumption in country i are given by
L˜i,t = h
′
ilst, (H.2)
C˜i,t = h
′
icst, (H.3)
where hil =
(
h1il, . . . , h
m
il
)′
and hc =
(
h1ic, . . . , h
m
ic
)′
are n−dimensional parameter vectors and st =(
s1t , . . . , s
m
t
)′
is the n−dimensional vector of state variables. Since the equilibrium conditions do not
include endogenous predetermined variables, the state vector st only includes exogenous stochastic
random variables (the TFP levels in each country).27
For simplicity, but without loss of generality, suppose st is a scalar random variable (say, TFP in
country 1). Then we have that C˜i,t = hicst and st =
(
L˜i,t/hil
)
. Substituting in equation (H.1), we
27The only endogenous predetermined variables in the model are the levels of debt in each country, Bi
(
st, s
)
.
However, these variables are not part of the equilibrium conditions. Instead, the equilibrium conditions include the
trade deficits in each country, Di
(
st
)
= Bi
(
st−1, st
)
−
∑
s∈S Q
(
st, s
)
Bi
(
st, s
)
, that are not predetermined variables.
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obtain
L˜i,t = σn
[
W˜i,t − P˜i,t − hic
(
L˜i,t/hil
)]
, (H.4)
and solving for L˜i,t yields
L˜i,t =
σn
1 + σn (hic/hil)
(
W˜i,t − P˜i,t
)
,
= ς
(
W˜i,t − P˜i,t
)
,
= ς
(
A˜i,t − θ
−1λ˜ii,t
)
.
(H.5)
with ς = σn (1 + σn (hic/hil))
−1, and where the final equation makes use of equation (17) in log-
deviations from steady state.
From equation (26), we have that Y˜i,t = A˜i,t + L˜i,t and making use of equation (H.5) to substitute
for L˜i,t, we obtain
Y˜i,t = (1 + ς) A˜i,t −
( ς
θ
)
λ˜ii,t, (H.6)
which has the same structure as equation (D.1). Therefore, the same factor structure as in (30)
applies to the model with intertemporal substitution in labor supply, when the model is solved
using log-linear methods.
I Capital in Production
In this Section we provide a detailed description of the version of the model that includes physical
capital in production which is examined in Section 5.3. First, we show how to measure GDP at
constant prices in this version of the model. Second, we show that the factor structure of GDP
correlations still obtains. Finally, we provide a detailed list of the model’s log-linear equilibrium
conditions.
GDP at Constant Prices (Capital in Production)
We first show how to construct a measure of real GDP consistent with the National Accounts,
analogous to the one derived in Section 3.1 but for the version of the model with physical capital.
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As before, GDP at constant prices in country i is
Y
(
st
)
≡
∫
Ωi(st)
pi
(
v, s0
)
yi
(
v, st
)
dv,
= Zi
(
st
) ∫
Ωi(st)
pi
(
v, s0
)
ϕi,vKi
(
v, st−1
)α
Li
(
v, st
)1−α
dv,
= Zi
(
st
)
Ki
(
st−1
)α
Li
(
st
)1−α ∫
Ωi(st)
pi
(
v, s0
)
ϕi,v
[
Ki
(
v, st−1
)
Ki (st−1)
]α [
Li
(
v, st
)
Li (st)
]1−α
dv,
(I.1)
with Ki
(
st
)
=
∫
Ωi(st)
Ki
(
v, st
)
dv and Li
(
st
)
=
∫
Ωi(st)
Li
(
v, st
)
dv, the aggregate capital stock and
hours worked, respectively.
Next, notice that
pi
(
v, s0
)
=
ri
(
s0
)α
Wi
(
s0
)
κZ (s0)ϕi,v
, (I.2)
is the same for all varieties v, except for the time-invariant idiosyncratic productivity shock ϕi,v.
Thus, the product ct = pi
(
v, st
)
ϕi,v, is the same for all varieties v. It follows that, from the
first-order conditions solving the intermediate producer problem, we have that
Ki
(
v, st−1
)
=
[
αp
(
v, st
)
ϕi,vZi
(
st
)
ri (st)
]1/(1−α)
Li
(
v, st
)
,
=
[
αctZi
(
st
)
ri (st)
]1/(1−α)
Li
(
v, st
)
.
(I.3)
From the above condition, it follows that
(
Ki
(
v, st−1
)
/Li
(
v, st
))
=
(
Ki
(
st−1
)
/Li
(
st
))
is the
same for all varieties v and, equivalently, we have that
Ki
(
v, st−1
)
Ki (st−1)
=
Li
(
v, st
)
Li (st)
. (I.4)
Using (I.4) in (I.1), we obtain
Y
(
st
)
= Zi
(
st
)
Ki
(
st−1
)α
Li
(
st
)1−α ∫
Ωi(st)
pi
(
v, s0
)
ϕi,v
[
Ki
(
v, st−1
)
Ki (st−1)
]
dv,
= Zi
(
st
)
Ki
(
st−1
)α
Li
(
st
)1−α
c0,
(I.5)
where we have used the fact that Ki
(
st−1
)
=
∫
Ωi(st)
Ki
(
v, st−1
)
dv, and where c0 = pi
(
v, s0
)
ϕi,v
is a positive constant which is irrelevant for GDP fluctuations and thus can be ignored.
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Factor Structure of GDP Comovement (Capital in Production)
In this Section, we show that the factor structure of GDP comovement applies to the model with
capital in production. To see this, use equation (I.5) and consider the average labor productivity
in the model with capital, given by
Yi
(
st
)
Li (st)
= Zi
(
st
) [Ki (st−1)
Li (st)
]α
≡ Ai
(
st
)
. (I.6)
This measure of productivity corresponds to our empirical measure of TFP and also to the measure
used in the baseline model (27). However, in the version of the model with capital, it is more
appropriate to refer to it as average labor productivity (ALP). Most importantly, notice that while
in the baseline model Ai
(
st
)
is exogenous, here it is endogenous and depends on the capital-labor
ratio.
Next, from equation (49), we have that
λii
(
st
)
=
[
κri
(
st
)α
Wi
(
st
)1−α
κZi (st)Pi (st)
]−θ
,
=
[
κ
(
ri
(
st
)
/Wi
(
st
))α
Wi
(
st
)
κZi (st)Pi (st)
]−θ
.
(I.7)
From the first-order conditions solving the intermediate producer problem, we have that
ri
(
st
)
= αpi
(
v, st
)
ϕi,vZi
(
st
) (
Li
(
v, st
)
/Ki
(
v, st−1
))1−α
, (I.8)
Wi
(
st
)
= (1− α) pi
(
v, st
)
ϕi,vZi
(
st
) (
Ki
(
v, st−1
)
/Li
(
v, st
))α
, (I.9)
for each variety v. Combining the two equations above it follows that the capital-labor ratio is the
same for all firms
(
Ki
(
v, st−1
)
/Li
(
v, st
))
=
(
Ki
(
st−1
)
/Li
(
st
))
, with
ri
(
st
)
Wi (st)
=
α
1− α
Li
(
st
)
Ki (st−1)
, (I.10)
where
(
Li
(
st
)
/Ki
(
st−1
))
is the aggregate labor-capital ratio in country i. Plugging (I.10) in (I.7)
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and making use of equation (I.6), yields
λii
(
st
)
=
[
κWi
(
st
)
(1− α)Zi (st) (Ki (st−1) /Li (st))
α
Pi (st)
]−θ
,
=
[
κWi
(
st
)
(1− α)Ai (st)Pi (st)
]−θ
.
(I.11)
Using (I.11) to solve for the real wage, yields
Wi
(
st
)
P (st)
=
(1− α)Ai
(
st
)
κ
[
1
λii (st)
]1/θ
, (I.12)
an equation analogous to (17), but where A
(
st
)
now corresponds to the aggregate average labor
productivity. Finally, combining (I.6) and (I.12), with the optimality condition (15), we obtain
Y
(
st
)
= A
(
st
)
L
(
st
)
= A
(
st
) (
W
(
st
)
/P
(
st
))σn ,
= ((1− α) /κ)σn Ai
(
st
)1+σn [ 1
λii (st)
]σn/θ
,
(I.13)
which again, is analogous to (28). From (I.13) it follows that
Y˜i,t = (1 + σn) A˜i,t −
(σn
θ
)
λ˜ii,t. (I.14)
This equation has the same structure as equations (29) and (D.1). Thus, it follows that the factor
structure of GDP comovement given by (30) also holds for the model with capital, with the only
difference that, from equation (I.6), the aggregate average labor productivity in logs, is given by
A˜i,t = Z˜i,t + α
(
K˜i,t − L˜i,t
)
, (I.15)
which is no longer exogenous, but depends on the capital-labor ratio. This proves Result 3.
Log-linear Equilibrium Conditions (Capital in Production)
The log-linear equilibrium conditions for the model with capital in production are the following
µ˜t + P˜i,t = −P¯µ¯
(
C¯C˜i,t − L¯
1+1/σnL˜i,t
)
, ∀ i = 1, . . . , n, (I.16)
µ˜t = R˜t + Et (µ˜t+1) , (I.17)
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E (r˜i,t+1) = Et
[
µ˜t − µ˜t+1
1− (1− δ)β
]
, (I.18)
P˜i,t + Z˜i,t = λ¯
n∑
j=1
[
αr˜j,t + (1− α) W˜j,t
]
τ−θij , (I.19)
λ˜ji,t = −θ
[
αr˜i,t + (1− α) W˜i,t − P˜j,t − Z˜j,t
]
, (I.20)
L˜i,t = σn
(
W˜i,t − P˜i,t
)
, (I.21)
r˜i,t − W˜i,t = L˜i,t − K˜i,t−1, (I.22)
(1− α)
(
W˜i,t + L˜i,t
)
+ α
(
r˜i,t + K˜i,t−1
)
= (I.23)
n∑
j=1
λ¯ji
[
λ˜ji,t + (1− α)
(
W˜j,t + L˜j,t
)
+ α
(
r˜j,t + K˜j,t−1
)
+Dj,t
]
,
P˜i,t +
(
1− δK¯/Y¯
)
C˜i,t +
(
δK¯/Y¯
)
I˜t = (1− α)
(
W˜i,t + L˜i,t
)
+ α
(
r˜i,t + K˜i,t−1
)
+Di,t, (I.24)
K˜i,t = δI˜i,t + (1− δ) K˜i,t−1, (I.25)
n∑
i=0
Di
(
st
)
= 0, (I.26)
A˜i,t = Z˜i,t + α
(
K˜i,t−1 − L˜i,t
)
. (I.27)
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